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Abstract
Background: Despite recurring outbreaks of cholera in Ghana, very little has been reported on assessments of
outbreak response activities undertaken in affected areas. This study assessed the response activities undertaken in
two districts, Akatsi District in Volta Region and Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) Municipal in Central Region
during the 2012 cholera epidemic in Ghana.
Methods: We conducted a retrospective assessment of the events, strengths and weaknesses of the cholera
outbreak response activities in the two districts making use of the WHO cholera evaluation tool. Information
sources included surveillance and facility records, reports and interviews with relevant health personnel
involved in the outbreak response from both district health directorates and health facilities. We collected
data on age, sex, area of residence, date of reporting to health facility of cholera cases, district population
data and information on the outbreak response activities and performed descriptive analyses of the outbreak
data by person, time and place.
Results: The cholera outbreak in Akatsi was explosive with a high attack rate (AR) of 374/100,000 and case
fatality rate (CFR) of 1.2 % while that in KEEA was on a relatively smaller scale AR of 23/100,000 but with a
high case fatality rate of 18.8 %. For both districts, we identified multiple strengths in the response to the
outbreak including timely notification of the district health officials which triggered prompt investigation of
the suspected outbreak facilitating confirmation of cholera and initiation of public health response activities.
Others were coordination of the activities by multi-sectoral committees, instituting water, sanitation and
hygiene measures and appropriate case management at health facilities. We also found areas that needed
improvement in both districts including incomplete surveillance data, sub-optimal community based
surveillance considering the late reporting and the deaths in the community and the inadequate community
knowledge about cholera preventive measures.
Conclusion: The assessment of the cholera outbreak response in the two districts highlighted strengths in
the epidemic control activities. There was however need to strengthen preparedness especially in the area of
improving community surveillance and awareness about cholera prevention and the importance of seeking
prompt treatment in health facilities in the event of an outbreak.
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Background
Cholera, an acute bacterial diarrhoeal disease, caused by
the bacteria Vibrio cholera is usually transmitted through
water or food contaminated with faecal matter [1]. An
estimated 20 % of those who are infected develop acute
watery diarrhea. The diarrhoea becomes very severe in
about 10–20 % of these individuals and may be accom-
panied by vomiting. Without prompt and adequate treat-
ment, these patients lose large amounts of fluid and salts
leading to severe dehydration and death within hours.
With appropriate treatment which largely hinges on fluid
replacement, case fatality rate is less than 1 % [1].
Annually about 2.8 million cholera cases are reported
globally and deaths from cholera are estimated to range
from 28,000 to 142,000 [2]. Cholera has become
endemic in Africa with large epidemics occurring in
different parts of the continent [3, 4]. Over the course of
2007 to 2011, more than 100,000 cases of cholera were
reported to WHO annually from at least 20 African
countries including Ghana with case fatality rates
reaching about 3 % [5]. Since 1970, when Ghana
experienced the first cholera outbreak, the country
has had many more epidemics occurring over the
years [6–11].
Because of the potential for cholera to become a major
public health problem and spread quickly locally and
even internationally, it is important to have a well-
coordinated, timely and effective response in the event
of an outbreak. Following an outbreak it is recom-
mended that an assessment of the outbreak response is
undertaken to identify strengths and weaknesses to
inform planning for improved preparedness and re-
sponse towards future outbreaks [12]. Despite the
recurring cholera outbreaks in Ghana, very little has
been reported on assessments of outbreak response
activities undertaken in affected areas. In 2012, an
outbreak of cholera affected 53 districts in nine regions
in Ghana with 9548 cases and 100 deaths and the case
fatality rate (CFR) was 1.0 % nationally [10, 13]. Districts
reporting cases were variably affected with attack rates
and cases fatality rates ranging from 0.8 to 374 per
100,000 population and 0 to 18.8 % respectively [13]. In
this paper we present the findings from the assessment
of response activities undertaken in two districts, Akatsi
District and Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA)
Municipal as they were the districts with the highest
attack rate and case fatality rate respectively in the 2012
cholera epidemic in Ghana.
Methods
Study areas
Akatsi District, shown in Fig. 1, is located in the south
eastern part of the Volta Region of Ghana (latitude 60S
70N and longitudes 00W 10E) [14, 15]. Even though for
administrative purposes Akatsi District has now been
divided into Akatsi North and Akatsi South Districts,
as at the time of the outbreak in 2012 however, it
was one district. It is divided into five health sub-
districts namely Akatsi, Avenorpeme, Gefia, Wute and
Ave-Dakpa for administrative and management purposes.
Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) Municipal in the
Central Region of Ghana, shown in Fig. 2, covers an area
of 452 km2and is located between longitude 1° 20′ West
and 1° 40′ West and latitude 5° 05′ North and 5° 15North
[16]. There are five sub-districts namely Kissi, Elmina,
Komenda, Ankaful and Agona sub-districts each with a
health center and Ankaful Hospital serves as the district
hospital. With regard to previous cholera outbreaks,
Akatsi District had not encountered any in over 5 years
while KEEA experienced outbreaks in 2010 (2 cases, no
death) and 2011 (44 cases, 1 deaths, CFR 2.3 %).
Study design and data collection
We embarked on a retrospective assessment of the 2012
cholera outbreak response in the two study districts. We
made use of the WHO cholera evaluation tool obtained
from the WHO document, Cholera outbreak: assessing
the outbreak response and improving preparedness [12].
To assess the successes and gaps, we inquired about the
actions that were undertaken during the response and
compared them to what was expected to be carried out
in an outbreak situation as outlined in the document
[12]. The tool provides a framework to assess the
components of the response to a cholera outbreak with
the view to highlight the strengths and weaknesses and
make recommendations to enhance preparedness and
improve the response to outbreaks that could occur in
the future [12]. Among the areas the tool outlines for
review of strengths and weaknesses are the organization
of the response, outbreak detection, laboratory confirm-
ation and surveillance activities, case management, con-
trol of the environment including water, sanitation and
hygiene activities and measures to control the spread of
cholera in the community. The components of the tool
are summarized in Table 1. To obtain our data, we inter-
viewed key members of the District Health Management
Teams (DHMT) of both districts who were involved in
the response to access data on those affected by the
outbreak and the conduct of the response as well as
information on previous cholera outbreaks in the
preceding 5 years. The personnel interviewed included
the district director of health service and the district dis-
ease control and surveillance officers. We also consulted
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KEEA District
Central Region
Fig. 2 Map showing the location of KEEA District in the Central Region of Ghana (Source Wikipedia)
Volta Region
Akatsi District
Fig. 1 Map showing the location of Akatsi District in the Volta Region of Ghana (Source Wikipedia)
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the health staff who were involved in the management
of cholera cases in the Akatsi and KEEA district
hospitals and health centers where the cases were
treated. We reviewed surveillance records and case
definitions used to define cases, outbreak reports and
health facility records and collected data on age, sex,
area of residence, date of onset of illness and date
reporting to health facility of cholera cases and district
population data which we entered on a 2010 Microsoft
Excel worksheet for analyses. We conducted descriptive
analyses of the outbreak data by person, time and place.
Utilizing the information on the outbreak response
activities accessed from the various sources including
the responses from the interviews, we tabulated the key
strengths and weaknesses for each district under the
respective components of the evaluation tool.
The exercise was a review of public health practice and
risk was considered minimal. Permission was sought from
the Disease Surveillance Division of the Ghana Health
Service and Central and Volta Regional Health Director-
ates and DHMT of the two districts. Informed verbal
consent was obtained from those interviewed. There was
no personal identifying information in the data collected
and all data was handled with strict confidentiality.
Results
Events and epidemiology in the cholera outbreak
Akatsi District
We found that on 11th September 2012, the Medical
Doctor at the District Hospital alerted the DHMT about
3 cases on admission with diarrhea and vomiting that
were suspected to be cholera. The three were from the
Wute Sub-district. Subsequently over the course of the
epidemic which lasted up to 26th September when the
last 2 cases was recorded, we noted that a total of 422
cases of cholera were reported. This was one case less
than the 423 cases reported at the national level. The
attack rate was 374/100,000 in the estimated population
Table 1 Tool for evaluation of cholera response activities
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of 112,836. There were 5 deaths, CFR 1.2 %. We noted
that all the five deaths occurred in the Wute sub-district
(four occurred in the home and 1 died on arrival at the
Wute Health Center). The district officials reported that
upon investigation of the deaths, they found one of the
affected individuals was a person who after successfully
being treated for cholera at the district hospital was re-
infected with cholera after drinking untreated contami-
nated water from River Tordzi, the community water
source. They indicated this individual had expressed
disbelief that the source of the cholera was from the
water and it was of their opinion that this reflected inad-
equate knowledge about cholera transmission among
some community members. We identified data for 418
of the cases for analyses and noted a few missing data
for some of the variables. About two-thirds of cases,
(285 in number), were recorded over 2 days 14th and
15th September. Figure 3 shows the epidemic curve for
the district. The majority of cases, 305 (making up 73 %)
came from Wute, while 90 (22 %) were from North
Tongu, the district to the west of Akatsi and 21 (5 %)
were from the Akatsi sub-ditrict. Out of the 387 for
whom sex was indicated on the line list, 52 % were male.
About 65 % of the people affected were between the ages
of 5 and 44 years. The age distribution of affected cases
is portrayed in Fig. 4. Ninety-eight cases, almost a
quarter of the total, required admission.
Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) Municipal
In KEEA, we observed that the first case in the 2012
outbreak was reported on 4th November when the
DHMT was informed of a death in a male adult, following
symptoms of diarrhea and vomiting in the Abee Com-
munity. Subsequently 20 more people from the same
Abee community developed similar symptoms most of
whom reported to Ankaful Hospital, the district hospital.
Three other communities Amisano, Prisons and Atonkwa
reported a case of cholera each over 13th to 14th
November. Kissi-Kumasi community recorded 7 cases
(22 %) over 18th to 19th November. No cases were re-
ported after 19th November 2012. The epicurve in KEEA
is illustrated in Fig. 5. With an estimated population of
138,410 we calculated the attack rate to be 23/100,000.
Out of the 32 cases in total, there were six deaths. The
district attributed the deaths to delay in reporting to the
health facility for management indicating that five of
these deaths occurred in the community (3 in Abee,
1 in Kissi-Kumasi and 1 in Atonkwa). The sixth from
Fig. 3 Epidemic curve of cholera cases and deaths by date reported, Akatsi District, 2012
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Kissi-Kumasi was pronounced dead on arrival at the
Cape Coast Hospital. We discovered on review of the
Ankaful Hospital admission and discharge records that an
elderly man died within hours of admission on 31st
October 2012 after complaints of diarrhea and vomiting.
This case, which could have been the index case of cholera
in the district, was not reported to the DHMT and so was
not investigated. Almost three-quarters of the cases (72 %)
were below 25 years with the 5 to 14 year group recording
the highest number of cases 12 (38 %), as portrayed in
Fig. 6. More than half of the cases, 17 in number (53 %),
were males. Even though 32 cholera cases was the figure
reported at the national level, we noted that the district
records stated that there 38 cases of cholera in total
during the 2012 outbreak.
Outbreak detection and confirmation
Akatsi District
We found that the Akatsi DHMT was informed of the
cholera outbreak within 48 h of the index case reporting
and immediately launched an investigation on 12th
September. Stool samples were sent to the Volta Regional
Fig. 4 Age Distribution of 2012 Akatsi District cholera cases
Fig. 5 Epidemic curve of cholera cases and deaths by date reported, KEEA District, 2012
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Hospital laboratory where Vibrio cholera O1 was
confirmed by stool culture. We were informed that the
outbreak investigation traced the source of the outbreak
to River Tordzi the major source of drinking water for the
Wute community. Cholera vibrio was isolated from water
sampled from the river and was the same strain isolated
from the stool sample. The River Tordzi runs through
Adaklu-Anyigbe District and North Tongu District and
downstream through Akatsi District. We gathered from
the district health officials that they found out later that
cholera had broken out upstream in North Tongu but the
Akatsi DHMT was not informed by their counterparts.
Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA) Municipal
We noted that within 24 h of occurrence, the DHMT was
alerted of a death following diarrhea and vomiting in Abee
Community and of cases reporting to Ankaful Hospital
with similar symptoms and embarked on an investigation
on 5th November. Samples taken from patients on 6th
November were confirmed for Vibrio cholera O1 by stool
culture 2 days later at the Central Regional Hospital in
Cape Coast and Public Health and Reference Laboratory
in Accra. The KEEA district health officials reported that
risk factors for the outbreak in Abee included an overflow-
ing pit latrine that was contaminating a nearby stream
which served as drinking water to some community
members while in Kissi-Kumasi, contamination was from
the public toilet close to the house of affected cases. They
also cited inadequate potable water and open defecation
in the communities as contributory factors.
Assessment of the outbreak response
We identified various strengths and weaknesses in the
response activities in the two districts and these are
highlighted in Tables 2 and 3. For both districts, we
found similarities in the strengths that were identified in
the outbreak response. For example response activities
were coordinated by multi-sectoral committees in the
two districts. Similarly in both, all cases managed at the
health facilities survived pointing to appropriate case
management at health facilities. The timely reporting of
suspected cholera cases to the DHMT in both districts
triggered prompt confirmation of cholera and activated
response activities. Educational campaigns on cholera
preventive measures including hand washing with soap,
making water safe before drinking and appropriate waste
disposal were undertaken in the affected communities in
both districts following the outbreak. Concerted efforts
were taken to disinfect water sources and other possibly
contaminated community sites and facilities including
public toilets, pit latrines and waste disposal sites. We
also found some similarities in the areas that needed
improvement in both districts. These included incom-
plete and inadequate analyses of surveillance data, dis-
crepant figures of total cases reported at national level and
the sub-optimal community based surveillance consider-
ing the late reporting and the deaths in the community,
inadequate community knowledge about cholera and
limited availability of management materials and protocols
in the health facilities. On the other hand there were some
contrasting aspects between the districts in some
components. Whereas Akatsi District lacked an epidemic
emergency plan, KEEA had one. KEEA conducted training
for their health staff in case management while this was
not done in Akatsi (Table 3).
Discussion
This paper highlights the events of cholera outbreaks that
occurred in 2 districts in Ghana Akatsi and KEEA and the
review of the response activities. For both, probable
exposure to the contaminated community source of drink-
ing water may have been responsible for the outbreak. The
outbreak in Akatsi was explosive with a high attack rate
and was traced to a contaminated stream which served as
common source of infection. That in KEEA was on a rela-
tively smaller scale with a high case fatality rate attributed
Fig. 6 Age distribution of 2012 KEEA District cholera cases
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to late reporting of cases to the health facility. Virtually all
deaths recorded in the 2 outbreaks occurred outside the
health facility. Following implementation of response
measures including massive community education and
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities, the
outbreaks were controlled in 2 weeks.
Cholera remains a threat to areas where access to safe
drinking water and adequate sanitation cannot be assured
[8]. Considering that 35 % of households in Ghana obtain
drinking water from a source that is not considered
protected or safe and only 15 % have access to improved
sanitation, the risk of cholera outbreaks remains high for
Table 2 Summary of evaluation of cholera outbreak in Akatsi
Activities and strengths Weaknesses/Areas for improvement
Organization of
the response
• Multi-sectoral Emergency Preparedness committee activated
and divided into 5 teams with assigned roles. Members
included DHMT, District Hospital Medical Superintendent,
District Assembly, pharmacist, District Chief Executive,
District Environmental Officer, Ministry of Food and
Agriculture (MOFA) director, security forces, education
director, Member of Parliament)
• Daily meetings were held to review activities and
re-assign roles
• There was documentation of activities conducted
including outbreak
investigation, interim and end of outbreak reports.
• There was no epidemic preparedness plan
• Available reports lacked adequate analyses of affected
persons in time, person and place and spot map
Surveillance and
laboratory confirmation
• The DHMT was rapidly notified by hospital staff when
initial cases reported
• The line list of cases was compiled at facilities, updated
at close of day and data transmitted to regional level daily
by call and to lower levels
to keep them on the alert
• There was availability of sample transport medium which
facilitated early laboratory confirmation
• Water samples from 5 communities were tested with
drug sensitivity testing conducted for isolated organisms
• Considering late reporting and deaths in community,
the performance of the community-based surveillance
system was sub-optimal
• Poor communication channels with North Tongu
DHMT so that the news of the cholera outbreak was
not transmitted
Case management • Cholera treatment centers were set up away from other
operations of the health facilities
• No deaths from Cholera occurred in the health facilities
• Outreach to support case management in Wute Health
Center (HC) was undertaken by doctor from the
District Hospital
• Infection prevention and control measures were ensured
in district hospital with adequate water, proper disposal
of waste and disinfection of linen & clothes
• Logistics were available and replenished when stocks
became low
• Private facilities participated in case management
• Cases from hard to reach areas were transported to
health facilities for treatment
• No case definition, assessment protocols nor
management flow charts were made available to
health workers
• No refresher training of staff in case management
• Waste disposal facilities at Wute HC was inadequate
Control of the
environment
• Water sources in affected communities and public
toilets were chlorinated
• Faulty boreholes were repaired
• Dead bodies and their homes were fumigated before
supervised burial by environmental health officers
• Dead bodies were not released to families for funerals
but buried under supervision of environmental
health officers
• There was no coordination with North Tongu
District in environmental disinfection
Control of the spread
in the community
• Education on food safety, hand washing, waste disposal
in schools, communities and markets was undertaken
• There were regular radio health education and mobile van
announcements in the communities
• Food stuff from affected communities were barred from
the market
• Faulty boreholes repaired and toilet facility built in
communities lacking them and people were informed to
use them instead of open defecation.
• Prophylaxis given to contacts of cases
• Restrictions on the movement of animals was enforced
with strays being confiscated
• Inadequate community sensitization regarding
contaminated drinking water as the source of
cholera. One death was attributed to re-infection
from contaminated water
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several communities in Ghana [17]. Therefore in tandem
with long term steps to improve WASH facilities, having
an enhanced surveillance system in place, high commu-
nity awareness about preventive measures and a prepared-
ness plan for mounting a timely and appropriate response
are imperative preparedness activities for effective preven-
tion and control of cholera outbreaks [5, 8, 12]. Ghana is
implementing the World Health Organization Regional
Office for Africa (WHO-AFRO) Integrated Disease
Surveillance Response (IDSR) approach for public health
surveillance which uses standard case definitions to
diagnose and track priority diseases for public health
action [18]. Cholera is listed as one of the epidemic prone
diseases and a single suspected case requires immediate
Table 3 Summary of evaluation of cholera outbreak response in KEEA
Activities and strengths Weaknesses/Areas for improvement
Organization of the
response
• Multi-sectoral Cholera task force involving the Municipal
Chief Executive, the District Health Management Team,
the District Assembly, District Environmental Officer (EO),
Ghana Education Service (GES), National Commission for
Civic Education, media, fire service, police and National
Disaster Management Organization was activated.
• A district Cholera emergency plan was developed
and implemented.
• Health education with media collaboration including
radio discussions and community FM announcements
was undertaken.
• Field investigations conducted in Abee and Kissi-Kumasi
were documented in a written report.
• Central Region Health Administration paid supportive visits
and supplied logistics for the response.
• Rapid response to contain outbreak
• No end of epidemic report with analysis of cases by time,
person and place nor evaluation with recommendations
to guide future preparedness and planning activities
Surveillance and
laboratory confirmation
• Rapid notification of DHMT by hospital staff when
initial cases reported (within 24 h)
• Carrie Blair media were available for sample transport
• Samples were transported to laboratory for
confirmation of cholera in timely manner
• The facility registers were reviewed daily for new
cases to facilitate community follow up.
• Cholera data was transmitted to the Regional level
and also shared with the sub-districts
• A line list of cases was compiled
• Hospital staff were not informed about lab results when
cholera was confirmed
• Discrepancy in number of cases reported to national
level and number on line list
• Late reporting of deaths in community level suggests
gaps in community-based surveillance
Case management • Cholera treatment center set up for isolation
of cases in Ankaful Hospital
• Good management: no deaths in the hospital
during outbreak
• Staff trained in management
• Infection prevention and control measures observed:
adequate water ensured, proper disposal of waste
and disinfection of linen & clothes
• Supplies were available and replenished when
stocks became low
• Emergency stock of supplies available in hospital
at the time of assessment
• No case definition, assessment protocols nor
management flow charts were made available to
health workers
• A patient admitted on 31 Oct 2012 with diarrhea and
vomiting and died same day was probably a
suspected cholera case that was missed.
Control of the
environment
• Water sources and public toilets were disinfected
with chlorine
• The overflowing pit latrine in Abee was emptied
following outbreak
• Dead bodies were fumigated before supervised
burial by environmental health officers
• The overflowing latrine had been reported to the
District Assembly earlier but no action had been
taken before the cholera outbreak
Control of the spread
in the community
• Education on food safety, hand washing, waste
disposal was undertaken in schools, communities
and markets
• Byelaws against open defecation were instituted
• Prophylaxis given to contacts of cases
• A community survey was conducted to assess the
effectiveness of the health education
• Community volunteers were mobilized to participate
and support in education
• The Hospital Public Health Unit (PHU) participated
in social mobilization campaign in the communities
• Practically all the deaths occurred in the community
suggesting inadequate community knowledge about:
o early initiation of oral fluid replacement on onset
of symptoms; and
o early reporting to health facilities
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notification within 24 h of occurrence to the next level of
the health surveillance system along the chain from the
community to health facility, sub-district, district, region
and national levels. The district, the decentralized admin-
istrative unit in the country, has the responsibility of
leading investigations into suspected outbreaks within
48 h of notification. The objective is to generate informa-
tion making use of surveillance and laboratory data to
guide relevant and timely public health response. As part
of preparedness, it is also expected that the district sets up
a multidisciplinary district public health management
committee which develops contingency plans with the
objective of strengthening the capacity of the district to
respond to outbreaks or public health events. Following
the response to the event, the district staff are expected to
document actions taken and prepare reports highlighting
these activities, the outcomes and recommended public
health actions to improve preparedness. In the use of the
WHO evaluation tool, the two districts had a number of
strengths in common such as the multi-disciplinary
approach to coordinating response activities, the timely
investigation by the DHMT within the recommended
48 h of the prompt notification of the suspected outbreak
with the resultant public health actions initiated to control
the outbreaks [18]. The surveillance system could however
had been more pre-emptive if the community based
surveillance (CBS) component had been more robust in
both districts and in the case of Akatsi Distict, the lines of
communication with the neighbouring district which had
an ongoing cholera outbreak had been more open as
recommended [18, 19]. Strengthening CBS involves creat-
ing awareness about diseases of public health importance
using simplified case definitions and tools so that commu-
nity participation in the monitoring, detection, reporting
and response to events of public health importance in the
community can be enhanced. Subsequently, the strong
CBS system can serve as an important alert or warning
mechanism in a pre-epidemic period [18, 19]. The various
multi-sectoral response activities mounted by the two
districts including extensive health education avenues
some of which involved using community volunteers to
impart information on preventive measures, appropriate
case management in the health facilities, decontamination
of water sources and improvement of waste disposal
facilities facilitated the control of the outbreak. It is
commendable that the health workers at the attending
facilities were up to the task and managed the cases
appropriately. Even though in both districts, the case
fatality rate was above the WHO acceptable rate of 1 %
this was not a reflection of poor case management in the
health facilities as all cases reporting to the facilities
survived [12]. Nevertheless, in consideration of possible
staff turnover and new staff coming in, it is useful to have
available treatment protocols and management flow charts
to assist staff in assessment and management and to
ensure that they are trained in their use [12]. The deaths
in the community especially in KEEA were related to
delayed care-seeking. Consequently, the district health
officials also need to explore the issues of poor health-
seeking behavior and access to care as possible factors
contributing to the deaths in the community. It is key to
highlight the importance of providing regular community
education on cholera signs and symptoms and prevention
and treatment measures even in periods outside epidemics
[12, 20, 21]. Capacity of community health volunteers
should be built to educate community members on
making water safe for drinking, regular hand washing with
soap and other proper hygiene and sanitation practices,
promote early reporting to health facilities and to report
insanitary conditions that may predispose the community
to future outbreaks to relevant authorities for action [18].
The relevant authorities should regularly inspect sanita-
tion facilities to ensure good working order and to prevent
and address problems arising from improper disposal of
excreta and contamination of drinking sources.
While Akatsi did not have an epidemic preparedness
response plan, there were a number of documentations
on activities including end of outbreak report. KEEA on
the other hand had a preparedness plan that guided
response activities and ultimately, the attack rate was
relatively lower. Reports on the outbreak activities and re-
sponse were however very limited. Preparedness plans
and documentation on outbreak response activities and
post outbreak assessments are key documents in outbreak
prevention and control [12]. The plan outlines important
preparatory elements to be put in place and activities to
implement including coordinating structures, logistics and
training to ensure an effective response is mounted in the
event of an outbreak. Given that risk factors for cholera
outbreaks exist in Ghana, it would be expedient for all
districts to have cholera preparedness plans that can be
updated as necessary and activated when the need arises.
Documenting events of outbreaks including compiling
complete epidemiological surveillance data, analyses on
time, person and place, response activities and the
retrospective evaluation of the outbreak identifies
strengths and weakness and pertinent information which
can be used to improve planning for future epidemics.
The data for this paper was obtained from available
documents as well as self-reports from the District
Health Management Team staff associated with inherent
issues of recall bias, limited avenues for independent
verification and missing data. Despite these limitations,
the assessment provides insightful information on the
assessment of response activities carried out following
cholera outbreaks, an area with limited published data
especially from countries like Ghana which is endemic
for cholera. Along the hierarchy from district to national
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levels, various stakeholders responsible for epidemic
preparedness and response may learn from the experi-
ences documented to inform and enhance policies and
measures for cholera prevention and control activities in
their relevant jurisdictions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper on the events and response activ-
ities in 2 cholera outbreaks in KEEA and Akatsi Districts
has thrown light on strengths and areas that were over-
looked or needed improvement for a better response. While
in the long term resources are invested to improve potable
water sources, sanitation and waste disposal, lessons can be
learnt that can inform short term effective prevention and
control measures which can be instituted to limit negative
outcomes of cholera outbreaks in the country.
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